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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Sherlyn Konstantopoulos, a former employee of Westvaco 
Corporation, and her husband, Dimos Konstantopoulos, 
brought this action against Westvaco, asserting claims for 
sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., as well 
as claims under Delaware law. The district court held that 
the state-law claims were barred by the state Workmen's 
Compensation Act, and after a bench trial on the Title VII 
claims, the court awarded some, but not all, of the relief 
that the plaintiffs sought. The plaintiffs then took this 




A. The following facts are either undisputed or were 
properly found by the district court. Sherlyn 
Konstantopoulos (hereinafter "Konstantopoulos") began 
work at Westvaco in September 1987. 6/30/94 Dist. Op. at 
3. After initially working as a "helper" in the "Finishing 
Department," she was promoted in April 1989 to the 
position of "helper" in the "Web" Department. Id. at 3-4. 
The Web Department contained a single printing press that 
used large rolls of paper spliced together to create one 
continuous "web" of paper. Id. at 4. Workers in the Web 
Department were divided into four "tours," and 
Konstantopoulos was initially assigned to "D" tour under 
the supervision of foreman Ron Hurley. Id. at 4-5. Mike 
Marshall and Ed Peterman were also assigned to this tour. 
Id. at 5-6. At the time, Konstantopoulos was the only 
woman working in the Web Department, and she was given 
little training. Id. at 6. The district court found that 
Westvaco "did not in any way prepare its employees - male 
and female - to work in an environment where men were 
working for the first time with women and where women 
were working for the first time with machinery." Id. at 32. 
 
During her time with this tour, "Ed Peterman, rather 
than provide substantial assistance to [Konstantopoulos] on 
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[certain] assignments . . . , gave nonresponsive, sarcastic 
answers to [Konstantopoulos's] questions `quite a few 
times.' " For instance, Konstantopoulos testified that on one 
occasion when she asked for Peterman's help with a lid on 
a drum, he responded: "Aren't you liberated?" Id. at 8. 
Another time, when Konstantopoulos informed Peterman 
that there was a malfunction on a particular machine, 
Peterman told her to fix the machine herself even though 
she had not been trained to do so. Id. Peterman also 
threatened on many occasions to send Konstantopoulos 
back to the Finishing Department if she could not perform 
in the Web Department. Id. Konstantopoulos's evaluations 
in late May reflected "below average ratings in several 
categories of work, including knowledge, quantity and 
quality of work, and judgment and common sense." Id. at 
9. 
 
During Konstantopoulos's assignment to "D" tour, Mike 
Marshall engaged on several occasions in sexually 
suggestive behavior directed toward her. 6/30/94 Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 7, 10-11. For instance, one day in April when she 
was working about 25 feet away from Marshall, with whom 
she had had no prior contact, "Marshall yelled: `Sherri, look 
at this.' [Konstantopoulos] looked up, `saw white' and 
Marshall's `pants' flaps open'; [Konstantopoulos] turned her 
head immediately and covered her eyes. [Konstantopoulos] 
continued working and did not discuss this experience with 
anyone." Id. at 7. Konstantopoulos testified that in June 
1989 Marshall made other similarly suggestive gestures or 
remarks on three occasions. See id. at 11. 
 
After these incidents, Konstantopoulos met with Frank 
Alcamo, the plant manager, and told him about some of the 
things that Marshall and Peterman had done. See 6/30/94 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 11. Konstantopoulos then met twice with 
other Westvaco management representatives on June 21, 
1989. See id. The first meeting was attended by the 
personnel manager and the supervisor of the Web 
Department, as well as the union president. See id. at 11- 
12. Konstantopoulos reiterated the information that she 
had given to Alcamo and also complained that her foreman, 
Ron Hurley, was not training her. Id. Westvaco 
management then met with Marshall and Peterman, who 
 
                                3 
denied the charges. See id. at 12. "Westvaco's `EEOC policy' 
was read to both Marshall and Peterman, along with the 
admonition that `increasingly severe disciplinary measures' 
would be taken if any further sexual harassment 
complaints were made against either of them." Id. Later the 
same day, Konstantopoulos met again with Westvaco 
management and agreed to be transferred to a new tour 
commencing the next day, June 22, 1989. See id. at 12-13. 
 
The foreman of Konstantopoulos's new tour was Larry 
Cahall, who "was not informed of the circumstances 
underlying [Konstantopoulos's] transfer." 6/30/94 Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 3. Konstantopoulos experienced harassment during 
this tour as well. See id. at 14-16. One day in July 1989, 
she found a note that said: "Sherry doesn't need help, she 
needs a babysitter." Id. at 14. On approximately July 19, 
her locker (and three others) were damaged, and shortly 
thereafter she found trash in her locker. Id. at 14. On July 
21, she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, charging that her locker had 
been damaged in retaliation for her complaints against 
Marshall and Peterman. See id. at 20. On July 24, she 
reported to Cahall that her locker had been damaged. Id. at 
14. Cahall then advised his supervisor, who issued a 
warning that anyone found guilty of vandalism would be 
disciplined. Id. 
 
In August, someone wrote a sexually insulting remark 
concerning Konstantopoulos on a clipboard that was kept 
near a machine in the Web Department. See 6/30/94 Dist. 
Ct. Op. at 14-15. Konstantopoulos reported this incident to 
Cahall, who said that it would be difficult to identify the 
perpetrator and suggested that Konstantopoulos erase the 
writing or throw the clipboard away. Id. at 15. 
 
According to Konstantopoulos, during the period from 
July 23 to August 28, 1989, a co-worker, Greg Games, 
made several sexually insulting or threatening remarks to 
her. See 6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 15. On one occasion, she 
said, he grabbed her by the neck and said that he would 
like to kill her. Id. 
 
"[Konstantopoulos] did not report any of these incidents 
to anyone at Westvaco at the time they occurred." Id. at 15. 
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"[She] testified, however, that she was`upset,' `afraid,' 
`hurt,' `humiliated,' and `diminished' by the various 
incidents." Id. at 15-16. At the end of every tour, 
Konstantopoulos was evaluated by foreman Cahall, and 
these evaluations were frequently below average or 
unsatisfactory. See id. at 16. 
 
On September 2, 1989, Konstantopoulos gave Cahall a 
note from her doctor, Costas A. Terris, advising that she 
should be assigned to a "light duty job" for three to four 
weeks due to "job and home-related stress." 6/30/94 Dist. 
Ct. Op. at 16. Westvaco asked Konstantopoulos for 
additional information concerning the type of light-duty 
work that she could perform, but she instead supplied a 
second note from Dr. Terris, dated September 14, 1989, 
which stated that she had been under his care since 
August 21, 1989, for the treatment of "severe work induced 
stress"; that "[t]here appear[ed] to be some improvement"; 
but that she should "remain off work for another 3-4 
weeks." Id. at 16-17. On September 11, 1989, 
Konstantopoulos supplemented her prior EEOC complaint 
by reporting, among other things, that a "derogatory sexual 
remark" had been written about her on a clipboard and 
that foreman Cahall had not taken any action in response. 
Id. at 20. She stated that she had suffere d"anxiety and 
stress resulting in los[t] time from work and extensive 
medical bills." Id. 
 
Konstantopoulos remained out of work until October 30, 
1989, when she "returned to work, able and willing." Id. at 
17. However, she elected to take a layoff, and she did not 
return to work thereafter until she was recalled on April 16, 
1990. Id. On December 21, 1989, while Konstantopolous 
was laid off, the EEOC issued two right-to-sue letters, and 
on March 27, 1990, she commenced this action byfiling a 
complaint against Westvaco. See id. at 21. Her complaint 
asserted Title VII claims for sexual harassment and 
retaliation, as well as a state-law claim for tortious 
infliction of emotional distress. 
 
When Konstantopoulos returned to work on April 16, 
1990, she was again assigned to the Web Department, with 
Ron Hurley as her foreman. 6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 17. 
During her first tour, she broke a piece of machinery and 
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was publicly chastised by Hurley. Id. at 17. During her next 
tour (April 23 and 24), she was temporarily transferred to 
the Finishing Department because there was not sufficient 
work in the Web Department. Id. at 18. None of her co- 
workers harassed her during this two-day period. Id. 
 
On April 25, Konstantopoulos was assigned as a helper 
in the Web Department on Larry Cahall's tour. 6/30/94 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 18. Konstantopoulos informed Cahall of her 
apprehension about the assignment, but Cahall was 
required by the collective bargaining agreement to transfer 
her to the Web Department "because she was the person in 
the Finishing Department with the most seniority who had 
worked in the Web Department previously." Id. Cahall, 
however, assured Konstantopoulos that he would be 
available in his office if she needed him, and he also 
warned the crew that he would not tolerate any harassment 
of her. Id. In addition, Cahall made frequent visits to the 
Web Department that day, "entering through a different 
door each time, and he spent more time than he normally 
would in the area." Id. 
 
Konstantopoulos made no complaints to Cahall that day, 
but she testified at trial concerning two incidents involving 
co-workers. See id. at 18-19. She stated that Mike Marshall 
and Ed Peterman "squinted their eyes . . . and shook their 
fist[s]" at her and that another co-worker threw away her 
lunch. Id. The district court stated that it was not clear 
from the record whether Konstantopoulos's name was on 
her lunch bag and that the co-worker who threw away the 
bag stated that he had done so accidentally. See id. at 19. 
 
After completing her shift on April 25, Konstantopoulos 
left without speaking to anyone from Westvaco. Id. at 19. 
The next day, she gave Cahall the following note: 
 
To whom in may concern: 
 
Ms. Konstantopoulos has been under my care for the 
past several months for the treatment of severe work 
related anxiety. She has now been referred to a local 
psychiatrist to continue therapy and has also been 




Costas A. Terris, M.D. 
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Id. Cahall told Konstantopoulos to go home and to call the 
personnel manager the next day, and Konstantopoulos 
responded: "Am I fired now?" Id. at 20. She never returned 
to work at Westvaco. At the time of trial, she had not 
worked anywhere else and had not looked for work. Id. at 
20. 
 
B. As eventually amended, the complaint in this case 
contained six counts. Count I alleged that Westvaco had 
violated § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), by "creating a hostile and 
intimidating work environment." App. at 33. Count II 
claimed that Westvaco had violated § 703(a) by engaging in 
various retaliatory actions against Konstantopolous as a 
result of the initial charge of sexual harassment that she 
filed with the EEOC in July 1989. Count III asserted a 
claim under Delaware law for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, and Count V asserted a claim under 
Delaware law for sexual assault and battery. This claim was 
based on, among other things, the incident in which Greg 
Games grabbed Konstantopolous by the neck and stated 
that he would like to kill her. The remaining count, Count 
IV, asserted a claim under Delaware law by 
Konstantopolous's husband, Dimos Konstantopolous, for 
loss of consortium. 
 
In June 1993, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Westvaco with respect to the counts of 
the complaint (Counts III, IV, and V) that asserted claims 
under state law. The court stated that "the facts of record 
clearly indicate that the alleged incidents arose out of 
[Konstantopoulos's] work relationship with the tortfeasor- 
employees as opposed to any affair or personal relationship 
originating outside the workplace," and the court therefore 
held that the tort claims based on these incidents were 
barred by the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act. 
6/4/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 11. For similar reasons, the court 
denied the plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint to add 
a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress. See id. 
at 18. In addition, since Dimos Konstantopoulos's claim in 
Count IV was derivative of Counts III and V, the court 
granted summary judgment on Count IV as well. See id. at 
12 n.4. 
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The remaining Title VII claims were tried without a jury 
in August 1993. After the trial, the court found that 
Westvaco had violated Title VII by subjecting 
Konstantopolous to a discriminatorily hostile or abusive 
work environment during the period from April 15 through 
August 27, 1989. See 6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 31-35. The 
court observed that while "one can find examples of 
conduct more severe than that evidenced of record," 
"[Konstantopolous's] testimony remains essentially 
undisputed on the record and evidences some physically 
threatening and/or humiliating discriminatory conduct." Id. 
at 33-34. The court further concluded that 
Konstantopolous's "work performance was directly related 
to the discriminatory conduct alleged, i.e., the failure to 
train." Id. at 34. The court then stated: 
 
Having reviewed "all the circumstances," and although 
the circumstances at bar are not so egregious as in 
other cases, the Court concludes that a reasonable 
woman would find the conduct evidenced of record to 





The district court further found that Westvaco "knew or 
should have known of the harassment and failed to take 
proper remedial action" during the period in question. 
6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 34. The court noted that, although 
Konstantopolous was transferred to a new tour after the 
meetings on June 21, 1989, Westvaco "did nothing to 
ensure that [her] new work environment would be any 
different from the one she was leaving." Id. at 35. The court 
continued: 
 
Plaintiff's new foreman, Larry Cahall, was not informed 
of plaintiff's complaints; he, therefore, did not formally 
address the matter of additional training for plaintiff on 
the machinery and never addressed at all any 
additional training for the crew regarding defendant's 
policy against sexual harassment. It is clear from the 
record that defendant generally failed to provide its 
employees with the information and mechanisms 
necessary to successful effectuate its policies against 
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discrimination. It is clear from the record as well that 
defendants specifically failed to remedy the hostile 
work environment encountered by plaintiff during the 
period April 15 through August 27, 1989. 
 
Id. As relief for this period, the court awarded back pay but 
declined to award front pay because the court found that 
Konstantopolous had failed to mitigate damages. See id. at 
37-38. 
 
The district court "decline[d] . . . to extend the hostile 
work environment characterization past August 1989." 
6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 35. The court noted that 
Konstantopoulos was " `ready, willing and able' to return to 
work (without any further discussions with defendant 
regarding the work environment) by October 1989 and 
continued to so affirm through April 25, 1990." Id. The 
court therefore concluded that "the incidents alleged by 
plaintiff in April 1990 [were] sufficiently removed in time to 
be considered independently from those occurring in 1989." 
Id. Moreover, the court wrote that those incidents, 
"considered independently, were neither severe nor 
pervasive enough to have created a hostile work 
environment." Id. at 35-36. Finally, the court found, based 
in part on Konstantopolous's "apparent attitude in April 
1990," that her "inability to work in April 1990 and 
thereafter [was] not necessarily related to[Westvaco's] 
conduct." Id. at 36. The court also concluded that the 
conditions of Konstantopolous's employment in April 1990 
were not so intolerable that a reasonable person in her 
position would have resigned, and the court therefore held 
that she had not been constructively discharged. See id. at 
36-37. 
 
Sherlyn and Dimos Konstantopolous then took this 
appeal. After briefing and oral argument, we certified two 
questions of state law to the Supreme Court of Delaware. 
Certification was accepted, and the Supreme Court of 





We turn first, however, to Konstantopoulos's Title VII 
arguments. 
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A. Konstantopolous first contends that the district court 
improperly evaluated the events that occurred during her 
second period of employment in isolation and that instead 
the court should have viewed them as a continuation of the 
harassment that had taken place seven months earlier. We 
hold, however, that the district court applied the correct 
legal standard and that its conclusion about the duration of 
the hostile or abusive environment to which 
Konstantopoulos was subjected is supported by the facts. 
 
"[A] plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by 
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a 
hostile or abusive work environment." Meritor Sav. Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). See also Harris v. 
Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). "For sexual 
harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe 
or pervasive `to alter the conditions of [the victim's] 
employment and create an abusive working environment.' " 
Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (citation omitted). The 
plaintiff must subjectively perceive the environment to be 
hostile or abusive, and conditions must be such that a 
reasonable person would have the same perception. Harris, 
510 U.S. at 21. 
 
The Supreme Court has stated that a determination 
whether an environment is hostile or abusive can be made 
"only by looking at all the circumstances." Harris, 510 U.S. 
at 23. See also Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68. This 
court has similarly stressed that the "totality of the 
circumstances" must be examined, Andrews v. City of 
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990), and has 
"precluded an individualized, incident-by-incident 
approach" to making such a determination. West v. 
Philadelphia Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 756 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
In this case, the district court expressly stated that it had 
examined the totality of the circumstances. See Dist. Op. at 
30, 34. Konstantopoulos argues, however, that the court 
merely "paid lip service" to this principle and "then treated 
the incident of April 19, 1990 in isolation." Appellants' Br. 
at 22. In making this argument, Konstantopoulos focuses 
on the court's statement that the events of April 1990 were 
" `sufficiently removed in time to be considered 
independently from those occurring in 1989 and, 
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considered independently, were neither severe nor pervasive 
enough to have created a hostile work environment.' " 
Appellants' Br. at 19 (quoting Dist. Op. at 35-36) (emphasis 
added in appellants' brief). We do not believe that 
Konstantopoulos has fairly interpreted the district court's 
opinion. A fairer interpretation, in our view, is that the 
district court found that the effects of the harassment that 
occurred from April through August 1989 had dissipated by 
the time that Konstantopolous returned to work in April 
1990; that, therefore, without any new incidents of 
harassment, there would be no basis for concluding that 
the working environment in April 1990 was hostile or 
abusive; and that the few incidents that occurred when 
Konstantopolous returned were not sufficiently numerous 
or severe to warrant the conclusion that the working 
environment remained hostile or abusive. We see no error 
in this mode of analysis. 
 
Moreover, we conclude, based on our own examination of 
the record, that Konstantopolous was not subjected to a 
hostile or abusive working environment when she returned 
to work in April 1990.1 Like the district court, we find 
several factors that support this conclusion. First, the 
passage of nearly seven months between the end of 
Konstantopolous's first period of employment and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The parties disagree regarding the standard of appellate review that 
should be applied to the district court's conclusion that Konstantopoulos 
was not subjected to a hostile or abusive working environment in April 
1990. Konstantopoulos contends that the standard of review is plenary 
(Appellant's Br. at 1) while Westvaco argues that the appropriate 
standard is clear error. Appellee's Br. at 1. Neither party, however, has 
briefed this issue, on which the courts of appeals are divided. Compare 
Crawford v. Medina General Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 835-36 (6th Cir. 1996), 
(question of fact reviewed for clear error), and Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas 
& Electric Co., 60 F.3d 1126, 1130 (4th Cir. 1995) (same), with Fuller v. 
City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995) (mixed question 
subject to de novo review). The Supreme Court "has long noted the 
difficulty of distinguishing between legal and factual issues." Cooter & 
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401-02 (1990). See also, e.g., 
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288 (1982). Here, we find it 
unnecessary to decide which standard of review to apply because under 
either standard we see no ground for reversing the district court's 
decision. 
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beginning of the second is significant. This hiatus provided 
an opportunity for the lingering effects of the prior incidents 
to dissipate. Second, as the district court noted, after 
leaving work for medical reasons in August 1989, 
Konstantopolous herself stated that she was ready, willing, 
and able to return to work by October 1989 "and continued 
to so affirm through April 25, 1990," when she eventually 
returned. 6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 35. Thus, 
Konstantopolous's conduct suggests that, in her mind, the 
effects of the prior incidents had dissipated well before she 
actually returned to work. Third, the nature of the incidents 
that took place when Konstantopolous returned is 
important. Although we can well understand why 
Konstantopolous would be troubled by the mute gestures 
made by Marshall and Peterman -- squinting their eyes 
and shaking their fists -- this incident cannot in itself be 
characterized as particularly severe. Moreover, the only 
other incident cited by Konstantopoulos -- the throwing 
away of her lunch -- seems minor, since it is not clear that 
Konstantopolous's name was on the bag, and the offending 
co-worker stated that he had thrown it away accidentally. 
Id. at 19. Fourth, it is apparent that Westvaco sought to 
prevent any harassment of Konstantopoulos when she 
returned to work and provided procedures by which any 
improper conduct by co-workers could have been remedied. 
As previously noted, foreman Larry Cahall warned the crew 
that he would not tolerate any harassment of 
Konstantopoulos and assured her that he would be 
available in his office if she needed him. He also made 
frequent, unannounced visits to the Web Department and 
"spent more time than he normally would in the area." 
6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 18. Konstantopoulos, however, 
made no complaints to Cahall either during or after her 
shift, and when she returned to work the next day with a 
physician's note stating that she had been advised to stay 
off work for six to eight weeks, she commented:"Am I 
fired?" All of these factors seem to us to suggest that 
Konstantopoulos was not subjected to hostile or abusive 
environment when she returned to work in April 1990. 
 
To be sure, there are factors that point in the opposite 
direction. One of these is the severity of the conduct of her 
co-workers during the period from April through August 
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1989. Although the district court observed that "one can 
find examples of conduct more severe than that evidenced 
of record," the court added that there was "essentially 
undisputed" evidence that Konstantopoulos was subjected 
to "some physically threatening and/or humiliating 
discriminatory conduct." Another similar factor is 
Konstantopoulos's assignment to work under 
circumstances that ensured that she would encounter the 
co-workers responsible for the prior harassment. 
 
We do not, however, agree with Konstantopolous that her 
argument is substantially supported by her assignment to 
work under foremen Hurley and Cahall. We recognize that 
the prior incidents of abuse by co-workers occurred while 
Konstantopoulos was working under the supervision of 
these men, but Konstantopoulos did not report any of the 
most serious incidents to anyone from Westvaco at the time 
when they occurred. See 6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 7, 10. 
Moreover, when Konstantopoulos briefly worked under 
Hurley's supervision in April 1990, no alleged acts of sexual 
harassment occurred, and when she was again assigned to 
work under Cahall's supervision, he took pains to prevent 
the recurrence of such abuse. Viewing all of the evidence 
bearing on Konstantopoulos's working environment in April 
1990, including all of the events that took place during her 
prior period of employment, we agree with the district court 
that she was not subjected to a hostile working 
environment in April 1990. 
 
Konstantopoulos argues that requiring her "to [w]ork 
[w]ith [t]he [v]ery [e]mployees [w]ho [h]ad [s]exually 
[h]arassed [h]er [s]even [m]onths [b]efore [c]onstituted 
[a]dditional [s]exual [h]arassment." Appellants' Br. at 23. To 
the extent that Konstantopoulos is simply arguing that her 
assignment in April 1990 to work in proximity to Marshall 
and Peterman is a factor that must be considered in 
determining whether she was subjected to a hostile or 
abusive working environment at that time, we readily agree. 
As we believe we have already made clear, we view this as 
a significant factor weighing in her favor, but after 
examining the totality of the circumstances, we conclude 
that her reassignment to the Web Department and her 
encounter with Marshall and Peterman are insufficient to 
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justify the conclusion that she was subjected to a hostile 
working environment when she returned to work. 
 
To the extent that Konstantopoulos goes further and 
suggests that requiring her to work in proximity to Marshall 
and Peterman constituted illegal sexual harassment per se, 
we disagree. As prior decisions of the Supreme Court and 
our court make clear, the proper test is whether, under all 
the circumstances, a reasonable person would find the 
working environment to be hostile or abusive. See Harris, 
510 U.S. at 23; West, 45 F.3d at 756; Andrews, 895 F.2d 
at 1486. We therefore see no justification for adopting the 
per se rule that Konstantopoulos seems to advocate. 
 
Nor do we believe that Cortes v. Maxus Exploration Co., 
977 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1992), or Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 
872 (9th Cir. 1991), on which Konstantopolous relies, 
supports such a per se rule. In Cortes, an employee, Cortes, 
was subjected to severe and persistent sexual harassment 
by her immediate supervisor, Acero. See 977 F.2d at 197- 
98. Although Cortes complained about this harassment to 
her employer's human resources manager, he did nothing 
to rectify the situation. Id. Eventually, Cortes was 
transferred to another department, but Acero continued to 
harass her. Id. Cortes again complained to the human 
resources manager, but he dismissed her complaints. Id. 
Eventually, Cortes was informed that she would have to 
work under Acero's immediate supervision or resign. Id. 
Although she told the human resources manager that she 
was afraid to work for Acero, the human resources manager 
replied that there was nothing that he could do. Id. 
 
Faced with this record, the Fifth Circuit sustained the 
district court's finding that the employer, Maxus, had 
subjected Cortes to a hostile or abusive environment. The 
court wrote: 
 
Even in light of the strong evidence that Acero had 
sexually harassed Cortes when she was under his 
supervision and that when given the opportunity, he 
had continued to do so even after she was transferred 
out of his department, Maxus transferred Cortes to this 
sexually abusive environment. When Cortes expressed 
her fears about accepting the transfer, Maxus refused 
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to take any remedial measures to protect her. . . . We 
find no clear error in the district court's conclusion 
that these acts amounted to sexual harassment within 
the meaning of Title VII. 
 
Id. at 199. 
 
It is clear to us that Cortes does not stand for the 
proposition that it is always illegal for an employer to 
require a prior victim of sexual harassment to return to 
work in the company of co-workers responsible for the prior 
harassment. Rather, Cortes, in our view, merely held that 
the employer in that case violated Title VII by requiring the 
employee to work in an environment where sexual 
harassment seemed almost certain and by refusing to take 
any remedial measures. 
 
Ellison provides somewhat stronger support for 
Konstantopolous's argument, but we do not interpret it as 
adopting a per se rule. In that case, a male IRS agent (Gray) 
persistently expressed a romantic interest in a female agent 
(Ellison), who did not reciprocate his sentiments and found 
his conduct to be "weird[ ]," "crazy" and "frighten[ing]." 
Ellison, 924 F.2d at 874. After Ellison complained to their 
supervisor, Gray was temporarily transferred from the San 
Mateo, California, office to the San Francisco office, but he 
was permitted to return to San Mateo six months later. Id. 
at 874. The Ninth Circuit held that "Gray's conduct, as 
alleged by Ellison, was sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter the conditions of Ellison's employment and create an 
abusive working environment." Id. at 876. Turning to the 
question whether the Treasury Department had taken 
sufficient remedial action to shield it from liability under 
Title VII, the Ninth Circuit concluded that it was unable to 
determine based on "the scant record" before it "whether a 
reasonable woman could conclude that Gray's mere 
presence at San Mateo six months after the alleged 
harassment would create an abusive environment." Id. at 
883. The court stated that it did not "know how often 
Ellison and Gray would have to interact at San Mateo" and 
added that "the facts concerning the government's decision 
to return Gray to San Mateo" warranted further 
exploration. Id. 
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We do not interpret Ellison as adopting a per se rule. 
Rather, the court merely held that, based on the facts in 
the record, it was unable to determine whether the 
employer's decision to permit the harasser to return to the 
same office as the victim created an environment that 
violated Title VII. We recognize that the Ellison court stated 
that it believe that "in some cases the mere presence of an 
employee who has engaged in particularly severe or 
pervasive harassment can create a hostile working 
environment." 924 F.2d at 883. Even this statement, 
however, does not endorse a blanket rule. Rather, it merely 
states that in some cases (i.e., those involving "particularly 
severe or pervasive harassment") the mere presence of the 
harasser "can" be enough to create a hostile environment. 
 
In sum, having considered the totality of the 
circumstances, we agree with the district court that, 
although Konstantopolous was subjected to a hostile and 
abusive working environment during her first period of 
employment with Westvaco, she was not subjected to such 
an environment during her brief second period of 
employment. 
 
B. In light of our conclusion that no hostile work 
environment existed at the time that Konstantopoulos 
voluntarily left Westvaco's employ, Konstantopoulos cannot 
show the necessary predicate to maintain a constructive 
discharge claim, specifically, that there were "conditions of 
discrimination" so intolerable that a reasonable person 
would have resigned.2 Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Even if we had not reached this conclusion, we would reject 
Konstantopoulos's argument that the district court erroneously rejected 
her constructive discharge claim "based on what it apparently believed to 
be additional requirements specified in Clowes v. Allegheny Valley Hosp., 
991 F.2d 1159, cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 441 (1993)." Appellants' Br. at 26. 
After properly applying the Goss standard for constructive discharge, 
6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 36-37, the district court observed that there are 
a list of factors that are "commonly cited by employees who claim to 
have been constructively discharged." Id. Contrary to Konstantopoulos's 
assertion, the district court did not "procee[d] impermissibly to impose 
those factors as additional requirements for a constructive discharge 
claim." Appellants' Br. at 28. The court merely used these factors as an 
illustrative guide in exactly the same manner as this court used those 
 
                                16 
F.2d 885, 888 (3d Cir. 1984). The district court therefore 
properly rejected her constructive discharge claim. 
 
C. Konstantopoulos next contends that the district 
court abused its discretion in excluding the testimony of 
her expert psychological witness, Jay Ann Jemail, Ph.D., 
based on trial counsel's failure to comply with relevant 
pretrial discovery orders. "The trial court's exclusion of 
testimony because of the failure of counsel to adhere to a 
pretrial order will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear 
abuse of discretion." Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d 1233, 
1238 (3d Cr. 1988). In determining whether a district court 
abused its discretion, we consider: 
 
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party 
against whom the excluded witnesses would have 
testified, (2) the ability of that party to cure the 
prejudice, (3) the extent to which waiver of the rule 
against calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the 
orderly and efficient trial of the case or other cases in 
the court, and (4) bad faith or wilfulness in failing to 
comply with the district court's order. 
 
Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 
F.2d 894, 904-905 (3d Cir. 1977). See also Beissel v. 
Pittsburgh and Lake Erie R.R. Co., 801 F.2d 143, 150 (3d 
Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1088 (1987). We have also 
stated that "the importance of the excluded testimony" 
should be considered. Meyers, 559 F.2d at 904. "[T]he 
exclusion of critical evidence is an `extreme' sanction, not 
normally to be imposed absent a showing of wilful 
deception or `flagrant disregard' of a court order by the 
proponent of the evidence." Id. at 905 (quoting Dudley v. 
South Jersey Metal, Inc., 555 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 
Applying these standards, we hold that the district court 
properly exercised its discretion in excluding Dr. Jemail's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
factors in Clowes, determining that an absence of strong evidence for 
any of the factors supported a finding that the plaintiff was not 
constructively discharged. Compare Clowes, 991 F.2d at 1161 and 
6/30/94 Dist. Ct. Op. at 36-37. The district court therefore used the 
proper legal standard. 
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testimony. Two factors strongly support the district court's 
decision. First, this is clearly a case that involves a 
" `flagrant disregard' of a court order by the proponent of 
the evidence." Meyers, 559 F.2d at 905. As noted, the initial 
complaint in this case was filed in March 1990, and the 
complaint was finally amended in March 1991. The cutoff 
date for expert witness discovery was extended at least 
three times before a final cutoff date of January 1992 was 
set. Nevertheless, Dr. Jemail did not see Konstantopoulos 
until January 1993, one year after the cutoff date, and 
plaintiffs' trial counsel did not advise opposing counsel that 
Dr. Jemail would be called as an expert witness until a 
pretrial conference on July 29, 1993, long after Dr. Jemail 
was first consulted and approximately three weeks prior to 
the scheduled trial date. Even then, plaintiffs' trial counsel 
did not fully comply with his discovery obligations relating 
to Dr. Jemail's testimony, and indeed he had not fully met 
those obligations when the district court held, on August 
13, 1993, that Dr. Jemail's testimony would be excluded. 
Based on these facts alone, we are satisfied that this case 
qualifies as one involving flagrant disregard of the pretrial 
order.3 
 
Second, we are satisfied that Westvaco was prejudiced. 
The district court so found, see 8/13/92 Order at ¶ 12, and 
we accept that finding. As noted, plaintiffs' trial counsel did 
not advise Westvaco that he intended to call Dr. Jemail 
until approximately three weeks before the scheduled trial 
date. Another week elapsed before plaintiffs' trial counsel 
revealed the substance of Dr. Jemail's expected testimony. 
See App. 53-56. Counsel listed only two dates -- on August 
13 after 3 p.m. and August 17, after 4 p.m. -- when Dr. 
Jemail would be available for deposition, and no report 
written by Dr. Jemail was ever turned over because, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because we find that this case involves a "flagrant" violation of pretrial 
order, we do not reach the question whether it also involved "willful 
deception." See Meyers, 559 F.2d at 905 (evidence should be excluded 
only in cases involving flagrant disregard of a court order or willful 
deception). As to the question of willfulness in this case, see footnote 7, 
infra. 
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counsel stated, Dr. Jemail did not prepare one. Under these 
circumstances, the finding of prejudice was justified.4 
 
The district court did not make findings with respect to 
several of the other factors mentioned in Meyers -- the 
importance of Dr. Jemail's testimony, trial counsel's good or 
bad faith, Westvaco's ability to cure the prejudice, and the 
extent to which waiver of the rule against calling unlisted 
witnesses would have disrupted the orderly and efficient 
trial of this or other cases.5 However, it is apparent that 
none of these factors weighs heavily against the exclusion 
of Dr. Jemail's testimony, and therefore a remand for 
further findings is not necessary. With respect to the 
importance of Dr. Jemail's expected testimony, it appears 
that some, but not all, of her testimony was covered by the 
testimony of another plaintiffs' witness, Dr. Antonio Sacre, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We are likewise satisfied that Westvaco was surprised when, 18 
months after the extended discovery cutoff and approximately three 
weeks before trial, plaintiffs' trial counsel informally notified it during a 
pretrial conference that he intended to call a previously undisclosed 
expert witness. Konstantopoulos argues: 
 
Westvaco could not have been genuinely surprised by the addition 
of Dr. Jemail as a witness. Not only did Westvaco know that Ms. 
Konstantopoulos' psychological condition and the cause of that 
condition were hotly contested issues in the case, but had also 
known since January 1993 that Ms. Konstantopoulos was seeing a 
new psychologist. 
 
Appellants' Br. at 41. This is surely a strange argument. 
Konstantopoulos would have us believe that, prior to July 29, 1993, her 
trial counsel did not know that he would seek to call Dr. Jemail as an 
expert witness and thus should be excused for failing to disclose that 
intention any sooner, id. at 37-38, but at the same time Konstantopoulos 
argues that Westvaco should have guessed well before July 29, 1993, 
that her trial counsel would have to and would attempt to add a 
previously undisclosed psychological expert witness. Konstantopoulos 
cannot have it both ways. 
 
5. A trial court's failure to state on the record its reason(s) for excluding 
experts is not necessarily an abuse of discretion. See Sowell v. Butcher 
& Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 302 (3d Cir. 1991). When a trial court does 
not state its reasons for exclusion, the reviewing court may apply the 
Meyers factors to the trial court's decision to determine if the court 
abused its discretion. Beissel, 801 F.2d at 150-51. 
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the psychiatrist who treated Konstantopoulos.6 We do not 
regard this factor as particularly favorable to either side in 
this case. 
 
We are likewise convinced that the issue of trial counsel's 
good or bad faith cannot weigh significantly in 
Konstantopoulos's favor.7 
 
The parties dispute whether Konstantopoulos's trial 
counsel promptly notified Westvaco after making the final 
decision to call Dr. Jemail as an expert witness. Westvaco 
contends that Konstantopoulos's trial counsel made that 
decision months before he eventually notified Westvaco at 
the July 29, 1993, pretrial conference.8  By contrast, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Konstantopoulos maintains that Dr. Jemail would have testified to "(1) 
the nature of [plaintiff's] emotional problems; (2) the cause of those 
problems (i.e., the sexual harassment); (3) [plaintiff's] therapeutic needs; 
(4) the results of the MMPI-2; and (5) the questionable validity of the 
testing done by [defendant's experts]." Appellants' Br. at 33. However, 
the first three subjects were covered in the testimony of Dr. Sacre. The 
only subject not covered by plaintiff's experts were the results and 
validity of the MMPI-2 test. Konstantopoulos sought to impeach the 
credibility of defendant's expert, Dr. Raskin, by casting doubt on the 
applicability and reliability of the MMPI-2. Dr. Raskin did not refer to the 
test by name on direct examination, but indicated that some of his 
conclusions were based on psychological testing. 
7. The district court made no finding regarding trial counsel's good or 
bad faith. On appeal, Konstantopoulos notes that Westvaco urged the 
district court to find that her trial counsel acted in bad faith but that the 
district court failed to do so. She then suggests that the district court 
rejected the proposition that her trial counsel was guilty of bad faith. 
See, e.g., Reply Br. at 12. We disagree with this characterization of the 
district court's order excluding Dr. Jemail's testimony. Making no finding 
on the question of bad faith (which is what the district court did) is quite 
different from finding that there was no bad faith. 
 
8. Relying on time sheets submitted by Konstantopoulos's trial counsel 
in connection with his application for attorney's fees, Westvaco contends 
that trial counsel prepared a subpoena for Dr. Jemail and paid her bill 
in February 1993. If it were necessary for purposes of this appeal to 
determine when trial counsel decided to call Dr. Jemail as an expert 
witness, we would remand this case to the district court for an 
exploration of the significance of these facially troubling records, which 
were not called to the attention of the district court in relation to the 
question of trial counsel's alleged bad faith. However, because we do not 
think that it is necessary to make this determination, we do not find a 
remand to be essential. 
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Konstantopoulos argues that her trial attorney did not 
make that final decision until shortly before the pretrial 
conference. However, Konstantopoulos does not dispute the 
fact that trial counsel had been preparing for the possibility 
of calling Dr. Jemail as a witness for some months.9 Yet 
despite this, despite the fact that the cutoff for expert 
discovery had passed more than a year earlier, and despite 
the fact that the trial date was rapidly approaching, trial 
counsel delayed notifying Westvaco. It seems clear that trial 
counsel was, at best, attempting to gain a tactical 
advantage by delaying notification of Westvaco until the last 
possible date that could plausibly be claimed as the date on 
which the final decision about calling Dr. Jemail had been 
made. This approach was not commendable, and the 
intentions of Konstantopoulos's trial counsel therefore 
cannot possibly weigh appreciably in her favor.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Konstantopoulos's trial attorney admitted that, as of January 1993, 
Jemail was being considered for "possible testimony." App. 53. 
Konstantopoulos's counsel asserted that in January 1993, he "did not 
know whether [Jemail] was seen for purposes of testimony or treatment 
or both." Id. 
10. Konstantopoulos tries to characterize her trial counsel's failure to list 
Jemail and disclose the substance of her testimony and test results as 
"excusable delay," akin to the "lack of diligence" that was held not to 
constitute bad faith in In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 793 
(3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, General Electric Co. v. Ingram, 115 S.Ct. 
1253 (1995). That case is inapposite. There, the expert had been 
identified and the substance of most of his testimony had been disclosed 
prior to the discovery date. The plaintiff's delay in providing part of the 
testimony after substantial compliance was held to be excusable. 
 
The instant case is more closely analogous to Sowell v. Butcher & 
Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1991). Several years before trial, the 
plaintiff in that case had been served with interrogatories, requesting the 
identification of experts and a summary of the substance of their 
testimony. See id. at 301. The plaintiff failed to list the experts until 
shortly before trial and did not indicate what the substance of their 
testimony would be. See id. "The record include[d] a detailed exchange of 
correspondence between the parties' attorneys documenting the refusal 
of [plaintiff's] counsel to make his experts available or to supply 
information regarding the substance of their testimony." Id. 
 
Here, as in Sowell, "Counsel . . . failed to satisfy the obligations 
imposed upon him by the rules of discovery and cannot now be heard to 
complain that the district court erred in failing to admit expert 
testimony." Sowell, 926 F.2d at 302. 
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We are unmoved by Konstantopoulos's argument that 
Westvaco could have "cured" the prejudice resulting from 
trial counsel's late designation of Dr. Jemail as an expert 
witness. The thrust of Konstantopoulos's argument is that 
Westvaco, by means of sufficient last-minute scrambling, 
could have managed to prepare to meet Dr. Jemail's 
expected testimony at trial. Even if this is true, however, 
Konstantopoulos would have gained a valuable tactical 
advantage by requiring Westvaco to focus its litigation 
resources on these efforts in the last days before trial. 
Finally, even if we assume that permitting Dr. Jemail to 
testify would not have disrupted the commencement or the 
progress of the trial in this case, that factor, either alone or 
in conjunction with the other relevant factors, would not 
persuade us that the district court's decision to exclude Dr. 
Jemail's testimony constituted an abuse of discretion. 
 
In sum, after examining all of the factors identified in our 
prior cases, we hold that the district court did not abuse its 




The final question that we must address is whether the 
district court correctly held that the plaintiffs' state-law 
claims were barred by the Delaware Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The Act restricts an employee's ability to 
assert a tort claim against his or her employer for "personal 
injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course 
of employment." Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2304 (1996). 
However, the Act does not prevent an employee from 
recovering in tort for "any injury caused by the wilful act of 
another employee directed against the employee by reasons 
personal to such employee and not directed against the 
employee as an employee or because of the employee's 
employment." Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2301(15) (1996). 
 
As previously noted, the plaintiffs' amended complaint 
asserted three tort claims under Delaware law. Count III, 
which asserted a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, alleged that Westvaco and its agents and 
employees intentionally inflicted acts of sexual harassment 
and retaliation on Konstantopoulos. Count V, which 
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asserted a claim for sexual assault and battery, alleged that 
Westvaco was liable principally as a result of the incident in 
which Konstantopoulos's co-worker Greg Games violently 
grabbed her by the neck and stated: "I'd like to kill you." 
Finally, Count IV asserted a derivative claim for loss of 
consortium on behalf of Konstantopoulos's husband. 
 
The district court held that all of these claims were 
barred by the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act. The 
plaintiffs argued that these claims fell within the "personal 
dispute exception" contained in Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, 
§ 2301(15), but the district court disagreed. The court 
wrote: 
 
[T]here is no evidence of a pre-existing private affair or 
dispute between plaintiff and any of her co-workers. To 
the contrary, the record is replete with evidence that 
any alleged misconduct occurred solely as a result of 
the tortfeasor-employees' relationship with the plaintiff 
at work. . . . [T]he tortfeasors' actions were related to 
the duties of their jobs; the duties of the tortfeasors 
required them to work together or to be in close 
proximity or to communicate with the plaintiff; the 
incidents were stimulated by duties, assignments, or 
conditions of work; and the incidents resulted from the 
fact that plaintiff was an employee of this particular 
employer. Accordingly, the facts of record clearly 
indicate that the alleged incidents arose out of the 
plaintiffs' work relationship with the tortfeasor- 
employees as opposed to any affair or personal 
relationship originating outside the workplace. 
 
6/4/93 Dist. Op. at 11. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that the "personal dispute 
exception" does not apply when an employee sexually 
harasses a co-worker for purely personal reasons. The 
plaintiffs contend that the record bears "no evidence as to 
why Ms. Konstantopoulos' co-workers . . . assaulted her" 
and that "[o]ne definite possibility was that they were 
motivated by personal bias against Ms. Konstantopoulos as 
a woman." Appellant's Br. at 49. Accordingly, the plaintiffs 
maintain, summary judgment on the state-law claims was 
improper. 
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Because we found no decision of the Supreme Court of 
Delaware that definitively addressed the state-law issues 
raised in this appeal, we certified two questions of state law 
to that court pursuant to Article IV, Section 11(9) of the 
Delaware Constitution and Delaware Supreme court Rule 
41.11 The Delaware Supreme Court accepted certification 
and provided responses that, in our view, require 
affirmance of the district court's decision. 
 
Our certification included the following query: 
 
Are an employee's claims against her employer for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and sexual 
assault and battery caused by acts of sexual 
harassment performed by co-employees arising out of 
and in the course of employment, and not based on 
any events occurring outside the course of 
employment, barred by the Delaware Workmen's 
Compensation Act, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, § 2301 et 
seq. (1985), or may they be included in the exception 
to the Act found at Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19 
§ 2301(15)(b)? 
 
In response, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that 
under the Act, "an employee's claim against her employer 
for personal injuries sustained during the course of 
employment, even if the offending conduct was of a sexual 
nature, is limited to the compensation provided by the Act." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The certified questions were: 
 
(1) Are an employee's claims against her employer for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and sexual assault and battery 
caused by acts of sexual harassment performed by co-employees 
arising out of and in the course of employment, and not based on 
any events occurring outside the course of employment, barred by 
the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Act, Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19, 
§ 2301 et seq. (1985), or may they be included in the exception to 
the Act found at Del. Code Ann. Tit. 19 § 2301(15(b)? Does the 
applicability of this exception depend in whole or in part on the 
subjective intent of the employee or employees who engage in the 
harassment? 
 
(2) If these claims are included in the exception found at Del. Code 
Ann. tit. 19 § 2301(15)(b), may the employer be held liable based on 
the doctrine of respondeat superior? 
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Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 1996 WL 580354 (Del. 
Supr. Oct. 2, 1996) at 1. The court went on to conclude 
that the "personal dispute exception" contained in Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 19, § 2301(15)(b) does not apply under the 
facts set out in the certified question. Konstantopoulos, 
1996 WL 580354 at 2. The court reasoned that the 
"personal dispute exception" is "restricted to an injury that 
is caused by conduct with origins outside of the work 
place." Id. Since our certified question referred to conduct 
arising "out of and in the course of employment" and "not 
based on any event occurring outside of the workplace," the 
court concluded that "[t]his type of conduct clearly does not 
fall within the exclusion provided for an act `. . . not 
directed against an employee as an employee or because of 
the employee's employment.' " Id. (quoting Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 19, § 2301(15)(b) (emphasis added in Del. Sup. Ct. Op.). 
The court further observed that its interpretation of the act 
was compatible with its purpose and that "[i]t would not be 
appropriate for [the court] to create a new exception . . . for 
sexual harassment claims." Id. at 3. In view of the Delaware 
Supreme Court's responses, it is apparent that the district 
court's disposition of the plaintiffs' state-law claims must 
be affirmed. 
 
For the reasons explained above, we affirm the decision 
of the district court. 
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